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Not A Wholly New Europe: 
How the integration framework shaped the  
end of the Cold War in Europe  
 
Abstract 
Although often rhetorically presented as a ‘new Europe’, post-1989 Europe was 
deeply affected by the trajectory of the Western European integration process prior to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  The fact that the European Community of the late 1980s 
was booming, its ambitions and dynamism at a historical high, did much to shape the 
manner in which most Western European countries, and France and Germany 
especially, responded to the geo-political earthquake of 1989-90.  ‘More Europe’ – 
i.e. greater integration - became the collective response to the potential challenges 
ahead – a trend which not only explains why Franco-German relations so rapidly 
discovered their equilibrium after the momentary uncertainty of November 1989, but 
also why Thatcher so quickly became isolated on the German question.  The 
dynamism of the integration process further encouraged the US to continue their 
longstanding support for European unity, and exercised a magnetic pull on the newly 
emerging governments of post-Communist Europe.  But this outcome had serious 
implications for Russia, since there was a fundamental incompatibility between EU-
based integration and the type of pan-European structure which might have enabled 
post-Soviet Russia to feel that it had an ongoing stake in the European game. 
 
 
 
The Berlin Wall fell at a time when the European integration process was advancing 
very rapidly.  Most of the existing literature on the end of the Cold War in Europe 
does acknowledge this fact, albeit often as little more than a piece of contextualising 
detail. Some authors, to be fair, do go rather further suggesting that November 9, 1989 
and its consequences had an important impact on the integration process itself, 
notably increasing the speed with which Europe progressed towards its pre-existing 
objective of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). But relatively few of those to 
have written about the end of the Cold War have gone very far in examining the 
possible chains of causality that run in the other direction – in other words the ways in 
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which the status of the integration process affected the end of the Cold War.  It is this 
gap that the current chapter intends to address.  In doing so it will suggest that a great 
deal of the rhetoric of total flux that characterised both public discourse and private 
diplomacy in the course of the 1989-90 period was in fact deeply misleading.  Much 
was undeniably changing in Europe as the forty year long East-West conflict came to 
its abrupt and dramatic end; but much else remained the same.  And the fact that the 
centrality of the integration process and the importance of its internal dynamics were 
among the key things that remained the same, would have vital consequences for the 
behaviour of several of the key actors in the months and years that followed.  
 
The existing historiography 
There has long been a tendency for the separate historiographies of Europe in the 
Cold War and the European integration process to ignore one another.1 A number of 
younger scholars, it is true, have begun to reverse this trend.  For the 1970s in 
particular we are beginning to have a literature that explores in some depth the 
interconnections between the East-West conflict and the changing shape and nature of 
Western Europe.2  There are a handful of cases where a similar attempt has been made 
to investigate the linkages in the 1980s also.3  And it is also a case that some of the 
more detailed studies of European decision-makers and the end of the Cold War make 
clear the way in which their central protagonists were preoccupied with both the 
sudden transformation of Eastern Europe and the ongoing process of radical change 
underway in the Western half of the continent.4  But more often than not it is the 
                                                 
1 N. Piers Ludlow, ed., European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, 
Cold War History Series (London: Routledge, 2007), 1–3. 
2 Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the 
Dream of Political Unity (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009); Maria Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie 
europeenne: les neuf et la cooperation politique europeenne de 1973 a 1980 (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter 
Lang, 2012); Aurélie Elisa Gfeller, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the 
Oil Shock, 1973-1974 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe 
to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009); Angela 
Romano, “Untying Cold War Knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the Long 1970s,” Cold War 
History 14, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 153–73; Angela Romano and Federico Romero, “European Socialist 
Regimes Facing Globalisation and European Co-Operation: Dilemmas and Responses – Introduction,” 
European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’histoire 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 157–64. 
3 See for example Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode eds., European Integration and the 
Atlantic Community in the 1980s (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
4 Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande: de Yalta à Maastricht 
(Paris: O. Jacob, 2005); Antonio Varsori, L’Italia e la fine della guerra fredda: la politica estera dei 
governi Andreotti (1989-1992) (Bologna: Il mulino, 2013); Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig 
Vaterland: die Geschichte der Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2009); this is also true of several 
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parallelism of such changes and such preoccupations that comes across more strongly 
than their causal links.  Much of the US centred literature on the end of the Cold War 
meanwhile, shows only a passing interest in the integration process, tending instead to 
portray Kohl’s European partners as hesitant and scared obstructions to German unity, 
ultimately swept aside by a diplomatic push for unification dominated by Bonn and 
Washington.  The European Community dimension of the issue figures little in 
Zelikow and Rice’s account; it is marginal in Hutchings; and peripheral in Bush and 
Baker’s recollections.5  Mary Sarotte’s 1989 is a solitary and honourable exception to 
this trend.6 
 In most other sub-periods, writing about European integration history has been 
equally culpable of disregarding the Cold War. Strangely, however, this problem does 
not apply to the end of the Cold War.  Rather the reverse is true indeed, with a 
proliferation of literature centred around the question of whether the acceleration of 
the integration of Western Europe that occurred during the 1989-1992 period was 
primarily a consequence of the geo-political earthquake that altered the European 
landscape during these years, or instead had more to do with internal, Western 
European dynamics.7  Related to this broader debate, has also been the controversial, 
and at times highly polemical discussion, of whether Germany gave up the 
Deutschmark (DM) and accepted to move towards EMU as the price for its partners’ 
(and especially France’s) acquiescence in German unification.  This is a case 
advanced by several serious studies.8  But it also something that has been picked up 
within German domestic politics by those who regret the passing of the DM.9  Other 
                                                                                                                                            
chapters in Frédéric Bozo et al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (London: 
Routledge, 2008). 
5 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Robert L Hutchings, American 
Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 
(Washington, D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997); George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf : Distributed by 
Random House, 1998); James Addison Baker and Thomas M DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: 
Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995). 
6 M. E Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
7 See for example the special issue of the Journal of European Integration History, 19.1 (2013) 
8 Kenneth H. F Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); David Marsh, The Euro: The 
Politics of the New Global Currency (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2009). 
9 See e.g. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-price-of-unity-was-the-deutsche-mark-
sacrificed-for-reunification-a-719940.html  
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scholars by contrast reject any notion of straight exchange or deal.10  Regardless of 
the line taken, however, this debate does focus closely on the existence or not of 
strong links between what happened as the Cold War came to its end and the 
simultaneous and subsequent development of European integration.  Any causality 
running the other way, however, has been much less discussed. 
 
A time of uncertainty 
A prominent theme within both contemporary commentary about 1989 and 
retrospective analysis is the sense that everything was changing so fast that nothing 
could be relied upon to remain as it had been before.  Needless to say this impression 
of flux was for many a cause of celebration and hope.  President George H.W. Bush’s 
famous proclamation of a ‘new world order’ was just the single best known of many 
public and private assertions of how much change the end of the Cold War order 
implied.11 It could easily be flanked, however, with any number of further optimistic 
statements from statesmen and analysts across Europe, hailing the collapse of the old 
barriers and the vast array of exciting new prospects for movement, dialogue, trade, 
and exchange that were opened up by the collapse of Communism.12  The promise of 
a new and wholly different Europe was at hand and for vast numbers of people this 
was a reason for genuine pleasure and anticipation.    
 Alongside this surge in optimism though, there was always another rather 
darker strand of rhetoric, which painted this very same possibility of widespread 
change, not as a cause for joy or celebration, but instead as a source of danger and 
instability.  Amongst the most talked about examples of this rather more pessimistic 
reading of 1989 and its potential consequences were two tête-à-tête meetings between 
François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, first in December 1989, then in January 
1990.  In the course of the first meeting, held in Strasbourg on the margins of the 
European Council, both leaders were open about their anxieties, the British Prime 
Minister exclaiming, ‘If we were not careful, reunification would just come about. If 
that were to happen all the fixed points in Europe would collapse.’  A little later 
Mitterrand would strike a similarly gloomy note, saying according to the British 
                                                 
10 Harold James, Making the European Monetary Union: The Role of the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2012). 
11 For the text of Bush’s speech: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm  
12 For a flavour, see ‘The Future of Europe: A Debate’ in International Affairs, 66/2, April 1990. 
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record at least, that ‘[h]e was fearful that he and the Prime Minister would find 
themselves in the situation of their predecessors in the 1930s who had failed to react 
in the face of constant pressing forward by the Germans.’13  And just over a month 
later, the same two leaders swapped another series of Cassandra like observations 
about the implications of rapid change, this time over lunch at the Elysée.  Once more 
Thatcher defined unification as a development that ‘would confront us all with a 
major problem’; and once again Mitterrand resorted to historical analogies, this time 
evoking memories of 1913.14  In the public arena too, various commentators warned 
ominously of the reawakening of some of Europe’s old demons and sought to pour 
cold water on the hopes of a freer more stable continent now that the Iron Curtain had 
collapsed.15  All was indeed changing, but not necessarily for the better. 
 This same sense of possibility, both good and bad, was the background for the 
debate about the ‘architecture’ of the ‘new Europe’, extensively analysed by Mary 
Sarotte.16 Central Europe was not perhaps a green-field site – there was just too much 
complex and potentially painful history buried just below the surface, as the break-up 
of Yugoslavia would soon demonstrate, for that particular metaphor to be appropriate 
– but the rapid dissolution of all of the various structures of international 
Communism, from the Warsaw Pact to Comecon, inevitably conveyed the impression 
that this was a brown-field site where planning permission could easily be obtained 
for any number of new institutional and organisational developments.  The 
proliferation of architectural plans for Eastern European or Pan-European entities that 
ensued, both publicly and behind the closed doors of foreign ministries, was thus a 
seemingly logical response to the exciting new possibilities that appeared to be 
opening up.17 
                                                 
13 Patrick Salmon, German Unification 1989-1990: Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III 
(Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 164–165.  The accuracy of the British record, at least in so far as 
it captured what the French President said, has been strongly questioned by Frédéric Bozo who has had 
access to the French minutes of the same meeting.  That Thatcher at least was pessimistic seems 
beyond doubt, however. 
14 Ibid., 215–219.  Mitterrand used the same 1913 parallel with Bush: Bush and Scowcroft, A World 
Transformed, 201. 
15 According to his most recent biographer, Kohl was particularly upset by a piece in the London Times 
entitled “Beware a Reich Resurgent”, Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: eine politische Biographie, 
2012, 557.  The reference would appear to be to a piece by Conor Cruise O’Brien which appeared in 
The Times, 31.10.1989. 
16 Sarotte, 1989. 
17 To take just one public example Adrian G. V Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War: 
Four Scenarios for the Year 2010 (London; Newbury Park, Calif.: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs ; Sage Publications, 1991). 
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 There was always, however, a tension, if not an outright contradiction, 
between this apparent tabula rasa in Eastern Europe and the very rapid process of 
institutional development well underway in the Western half of the European 
continent.  That same Strasbourg Council meeting, on the margins of which 
Mitterrand and Thatcher met to exchange the anxious comments cited above, was 
after all just the latest in a long string of top-level European encounters when the 
leaders of the European Community gathered to debate, discuss, and to attempt to 
direct, the astonishing burst of speed that the integration process had put on since 
1985-86.  The exact reasons for this Western European ‘acceleration of history’ need 
not detain us here.18  But what does matter in the context of a discussion of the end of 
the Cold War is first that this process of rapid advance was well underway by 1989, 
second that no apparent end was in sight, and third that most of the governments of 
Western Europe, with one key exception, were delighted with the acceleration that 
had occurred.  The ‘Eurosclerosis’ of the early 1980s had been replaced by the 
surging ‘Euro-optimism’ of the decade’s end.  The mood was well captured – and 
further stimulated – by the increasingly confident rhetoric of Jacques Delors, the 
President of the European Commission and the person most often seen as the 
embodiment of the relaunch of the integration process.  In October 1989, for instance, 
Delors made a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges which not only trumpeted 
the growing achievements of the integration process, but also presented European 
unity as the vital response to the wave of change sweeping the eastern half of the 
continent.  It was European unity, Delors claimed that was in part responsible for 
drawing the gaze of Eastern Europe towards the West; but it was only through further 
unity that the West would be able adequately to respond, whether to the imperative to 
assist the transformation underway in the Communist bloc, or to the need to allow the 
German people to rediscover their unity.19 
Also of some relevance are two further characteristics of the European 
integration process.  The first was that ever since its inception, the task of binding 
together an initially limited number of Western European countries, had been 
                                                 
18 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998); Nicolas Jabko, Playing the Market: A Political Strategy 
for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); N. Piers Ludlow, “From 
Deadlock to Dynamism: The European Community in the 1980s,” in Origins and Evolution of the 
European Union, ed. Desmond Dinan (Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
19 Jacques Delors speech at the College of Europe, October 17, 1989.  Available at 
https://www.coleurope.eu/speeches/older  
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presented rhetorically and conceptualised by its advocates, as a process of unifying 
Europe, of construction Européenne, with no overt geographical limitation within that 
continent. Robert Schuman for instance had introduced his famous scheme in May 
1950 for what would become the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) with 
the claim that France was acting as ‘le champion de l’Europe unie’ and with a 
deliberate allusion back to the Briand Plan of 1929-30 which had been addressed to 
all European members of the League of Nations.20 The fact that only six countries had 
initially taken part in the ECSC and later the EEC – a minority within Western 
Europe, let alone within Europe as a whole – had in no way diminished this somewhat 
overblown self-understanding, nor had the reality that the policy scope of the early 
Community structures was narrow in the extreme.  Instead integration had always 
been viewed as something that should, could, and indeed must, expand its scope both 
geographically and in policy reach in order to accomplish its fundamental task.  This 
in-built expansionist tendency had further made co-existence between the European 
Communities and many of the other institutional structures that littered the European 
landscape systematically uncomfortable, as entities from the Organisation for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), through to the Council of Europe, had discovered in the course of the 1950-
1989 period.21 There was hence no a priori reason to assume that integration would 
forever remain a purely Western European phenomenon. The mere presence, 
furthermore, of an expansionist and successful set of institutional structures within the 
western half of the continent, was always likely to affect the scope to build new 
entities, either in the East alone, or spanning the whole of Europe.  To resume the 
metaphor above, the ambitious architectural plans already being implemented by the 
Ten existing EC member states, were bound to have an impact on what would be 
possible to build elsewhere in Europe.  The brown field plot was flanked by a 
construction site upon which a great deal of building was already underway, and its 
development would inevitably be affected by the ongoing work next door. 
Second, since the 1970s in particular, the institutions of the European 
Community and the majority of member states involved with it, had also begun quite 
                                                 
20 The text of the Schuman Declaration can be found at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_fr.htm  
21 For an intelligent discussion of both the EC/EU’s co-existence with other bodies, and its expansionist 
tendencies, see Kiran Klaus Patel, “Provincialising European Union: Co-Operation and Integration in 
Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Contemporary European History 22, no. 04 (2013): 649–73. 
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explicitly to associate integration with the spread and consolidation of democracy.22  
The first testing ground for this ‘democratic mission’ had been southern Europe, 
where an acute awareness of the practical difficulties of expanding the Community in 
the 1970s and early 1980s to three rather poorer countries like Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, especially at a time when Western Europe as a whole was struggling with 
economic underperformance, had been more or less counterbalanced by a very strong 
belief that the three countries had to be allowed to join so as to preserve and 
strengthen their fledgling democratic systems and to honour the innumerable promises 
that had been made towards them by Western European politicians in the early stages 
of the Greek and Iberian transition processes.23 By 1989, therefore, the European 
Community had already had a direct experience of seeking to assist in a complex 
process of democratic transition.  And with the economies of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal booming, not least because of the influx of both Community money and 
direct investment attracted by EC membership, Brussels was rather proud of its 
achievements in this regard.24 
It is true of course that the Community itself was not immune from that 
generalised sense that all was changing and that nothing could be taken for granted 
discussed above. At the more tendentious end of the speculations about Europe and 
European integration’s future, were those commentators who argued that the 
European Community had been a product of the Cold War system, and now that this 
system had come to an end, so too should the EC itself.25  Rather more substantive, 
were the anxieties about how unification and the end of Germany’s status as a 
vulnerable front line state in the Cold War, would affect the European vocation of the 
Federal Republic.  The mere possibility that Bonn might be replaced as the capital 
city by Berlin, provoked a wave of concern that a Berlin Republic might not be the 
                                                 
22 A first significant step in this direction had been taken with the Declaration on European Identity, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 12, December 1973.  It was followed by the Declaration on 
Democracy, adopted by the European institutions in April 1978.  Bulletin of the European 
Communities, No. 3, 1978. 
23 The best analysis of the Greek case is Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-
1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); for Spain see Matthieu Trouvé, L’Espagne et 
l’Europe: de la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008) 
24 For a favourable Spanish government assessment of the first three years of EC membership – and a 
view which would have been shared by many in Brussels, see http://www.cvce.eu/recherche/unit-
content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/15bb0adb-1ff0-4299-b0aa-
a9563ce40459/Resources#5415f5e8-2a93-44ba-8a90-891f8b3a92e9_fr&overlay  
25 Delors referred to such claims in his speech to the European Parliament presenting the Community’s 
programme for 1990.  The full text is available at http://aei.pitt.edu/8600/  
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same, pacific, and cooperative country that the Bonn Republic had been.26  Still others 
evoked the problems of imbalance that might afflict the EC when confronted with the 
new colossus, in both population and economic terms, which Germany now seemed 
likely to become.  One of the secrets of the early Community’s success had been the 
way in which Germany’s Cold War-induced amputation had meant that the fiction of 
equality between France and Germany, and indeed amongst all four of the EC’s larger 
member states, had not been too much of a stretch to maintain.  West Germany, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom really were quite close to one another in terms 
of population and geographical size, thereby justifying the way in which they each 
enjoyed the same number of votes in the Council of Ministers, the same number of 
European Parliamentarians, and the same number of Commissioners. A reunified 
Germany by contrast would have to be acknowledged as a much larger entity than any 
of its EC partners, with a corresponding impact on the balance of power within the 
Community’s institutional framework.  That this soon to be enlarged country at 
Europe’s heart, had also grown into an economic powerhouse whose success and 
power within the European Community was already a cause for concern to some of its 
European partners well before the Berlin Wall came down, only aggravated the 
apprehension about what reunification might do to the EC system.27  Could 
integration really cope with a Germany which grew even more powerful and 
economically successful?  Kohl himself acknowledged the power of such anxieties 
when talking to US Secretary of State James Baker in December 1989: ‘Schon jezt sei 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wirtschaftlich Nummer eins in Europa. Wenn jezt 
noch 17 Mio. Deutsche dazukämen, sei das eben für manche ein Alptraum.’28 
The Community’s collective response to these anxieties, however, was deeply 
revealing.  Existential fears certainly existed, and as the government records slowly 
come out over the next decade or so, we will probably read more and more accounts 
of European leaders pooling their apprehensions about how Germany’s altered 
position and status might upset the EC system and maybe even endanger the whole 
                                                 
26 William E. Paterson, “From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic,” German Politics 9, no. 1 (April 1, 
2000): 23–40. 
27 The most obvious example of French and other concerns about excess German power occurred in the 
1980s debate about monetary integration, see Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, European Monetary 
Integration from the European Monetary System to Economic and Monetary Union (London: 
Longman, 1998). 
28 Hanns Jürgen Küsters & Daniel Hofmann, ed., Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des 
Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1998), 638. 
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integration process.  Thatcher will almost certainly not prove to be the only Cassandra 
out there, but instead very much in line with most of her fellow European Council 
members.  This helps explain Chancellor Kohl’s painful recollections of the debate at 
the Strasbourg Council in the course of which he supposedly felt himself and his 
country to be in the dock.29  But just as has more recently been the case in the crisis 
over the future of the Euro which has unfolded from 2009 onwards, agonised internal 
debate complete with dire speculation about the approaching abyss was swiftly 
followed by two very powerful reflex responses on the part of most of Western 
Europe’s leaders, the first to hang on with grim determination to all that had already 
been achieved, and the second to answer the new challenges with further integration 
rather than retreat.  More Europe not less was the instinctive policy solution reached 
for by Europe’s political elites in 1989-90 much as it has been when confronted by 
serious crisis more recently.30  As Mitterrand put it with a degree of hyperbole during 
his head to head meeting with the German Chancellor in January 1990, for the first 
time in a thousand years there was an answer to the problem posed to France by the 
presence of 80 million Germans next door, and that answer was the greater unity of 
France, Germany and Europe.31  And the capacity of Europe’s leaders to deliver 
‘more Europe’ as a solution to the challenge of German unification was greatly aided 
by the fact that in the late 1980s European integration was already set on a path of 
policy expansion and appeared to be moving along this path with considerable speed. 
The integrating Western Europe of 1989-90 was not therefore the type of 
neighbour which the self-appointed architects of the new Europe could easily ignore 
as they sought to construct either structures within the newly liberated Eastern half of 
the continent or overarching pan-European frameworks.  Instead each of the realities 
listed above would have a significant effect on the evolution of events in the period 
that followed.  In understanding what was and wasn’t built in the aftermath of 1989 it 
matters immensely that the political leadership of virtually all of the states in the 
western half of the European continent was deeply committed to an integration 
process that seemed to be going from strength to strength, which had already 
demonstrated over the preceding four decades that it had pronounced expansionist 
tendencies in both geographical and policy-related terms, and which prided itself on 
                                                 
29 See the analysis of Strasbourg below. 
30 For details of how this happened in France, see Bozo, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et 
l’unification Allemande, 196–199. 
31 Küsters and Hofmann, Deutsche Einheit, 686. 
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the recent successful absorption of another European region that had freshly emerged 
from autocratic rule.  And equally important was the further reality that, to the extent 
that Western Europe’s leaders felt threatened or anxious about the degree of change in 
their international environment and potentially to the internal balance of the EC, their 
instinctive response was not merely to protect what they had achieved but also to seek 
to push ahead further and faster with their experiment.  The notion of a fuite en avant 
– or flight forwards - has been a recurrent one within integration history, but it has 
seldom applied more strongly and more significantly than in the exhilarating, but also 
anxiety-inducing days, weeks and months that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
Framing the European debate 
In no single country was the importance of the European factor more apparent than 
within the Federal Republic itself.  Kohl’s pedigree as a strong pro-European was 
well-established long before 1989.32  Indeed the strength and effectiveness of the 
German Chancellor’s relationships with both Mitterrand and with Delors had been 
absolutely central to the whole story of European integration’s relance since 1985.33  
It was therefore always likely that West German policy in the run-up to reunification 
would be presented in a fashion that stressed the compatibility of rapid movement to 
German unity and simultaneous advance towards European unity.  That point seven 
of Kohl’s ‘Ten Point Plan’ presented to the Bundestag on November 28, 1989 
reaffirmed the Federal Republic’s commitment to the centrality of the integration 
process was therefore no surprise.  Revealingly Kohl continued: ‘[T]he EC must not 
end at the Elbe; rather, it must also maintain openness towards the East. Only in this 
sense – for we have always understood the Europe of twelve to be only a part and not 
the whole – can the European Community serve as the foundation for a truly 
comprehensive European unification. Only in this sense is the identity of all 
Europeans maintained, asserted, and developed. This identity, ladies and gentlemen, 
                                                 
32 Schwarz, Helmut Kohl, 397–418. 
33 Carine Germond, “Dynamic Franco-German Duos: Giscard-Schmidt and Mitterrand-Kohl,” in The 
Oxford Handbok of the European Union, ed. Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen Weatherill 
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is based not only in the cultural diversity of Europe, but also, and above all, in the 
basic rights of freedom, democracy, human rights, and self-determination.’34 
 In explaining his position, Kohl tended to present himself as the heir of 
Konrad Adenauer, grounding his whole approach to Deutschlandspolitik on the 
Federal Republic’s secure western alignment, including therefore European 
integration.35  This had some historical justification and certainly made party political 
sense.  But in many ways a more suggestive precedent was that of Willy Brandt, who 
had accompanied his own radical eastern policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
with a western policy designed to demonstrate that Bonn remained as committed as 
ever to its European partners.36  Brandt too spoke eloquently about West Germany’s 
commitment to Europe partly so as to soothe his western allies’ fears about where his 
Ostpolitik might lead.  And Brandt also matched pro-European rhetoric with concrete 
policy steps and proposals, committing his country to a bold new push for European 
monetary integration and an effort to coordinate European foreign policy positions, 
each of which foreshadowed some of the steps taken in the 1989-91 period.37 
Statements like that which Kohl made to Bush in December 1989 denying that his 10-
point plan constituted any form of alternative to European unity were thus straight out 
of a tactical manual that might have been drafted by his left-of-centre predecessor – a 
point which rather underlines the basic argument about how impossible it is fully to 
explain German or other European policy making without frequent references to the 
wider European framework.38 
 The broader domestic debate about Germany’s identity that accompanied the 
unification process also highlighted the importance of the Federal Republic’s 
European vocation.  This is something that others have analysed in much more depth 
                                                 
34 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=117  
35 For a specific example, see Küsters and Hofmann, Deutsche Einheit, 638. On Adenauer’s policies, 
see Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876-1952 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 
1986); Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1991); Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the 
West, 1949-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004). 
36 Andreas Wilkens, “New Ostpolitik and European Integration. Concept and Policies in the Brandt 
Era.,” in European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. N. Piers 
Ludlow (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 67–80; Wilfried Loth, “Détente and European Integration in the 
Policies of Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou,” in European Integration and the Cold War. 
Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, ed. N. Piers Ludlow (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 53–66. 
37 The best collection of essays on European integration and the attempted relance of the Brandt era is 
Jan van der Harst, Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, 
Widening and Completion, 1969-1975 (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007). 
38 Küsters and Hofmann, Deutsche Einheit, 602. See also Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 
198–199. 
 13 
than is possible here.39  But what matters for the purposes of this chapter is simply to 
observe that Germany’s European track-record was one of the key pieces of evidence 
advanced by those seeking to prove that post-1945 Germany had changed 
fundamentally, had rid itself entirely of its earlier expansionist ambitions, and could 
hence be trusted to unite without endangering itself or its neighbours.  Flanking 
moves to German unity, with policies designed to further European integration, was 
not simply tactically astute vis-à-vis the FRG’s main international allies.  It was also 
an approach that played well domestically, calming fears that an end to West 
Germany’s aberrant postwar status might also signal the end of the country’s 
distinctively cooperative approach to international and European affairs.  Being a 
good European, was also an indication of being a good German, to put it slightly 
flippantly. 
 The context of successful European integration also shaped the response of 
Germany’s partners within the EC. Understandably, much has been made – in the 
German-language literature in particular - of the level of hostility towards 
reunification which Kohl initially encountered from European leaders with whom he 
believed he had established a strong working rapport.40  The Chancellor’s own 
memoirs thus observe, ‘Es gab in diesen Wochen und Monaten Äußerungen, bei 
denen ich mich fragte, ob man zwanzig Jahre umsonst miteinander gearbeitet hatte.’41  
And nowhere was the contrast between German expectations of understanding and the 
reality of the cool, even frosty, response of Kohl’s European colleagues more stark 
than at the Strasbourg Council referred to earlier. For it was on the occasion of this 
European Summit that Kohl found himself rounded upon not just by Thatcher (whose 
opposition was largely predictable and whose relationship with the German 
Chancellor was already highly strained not least because of clashes over integration 
priorities) but also by fellow Christian Democrats and former European allies, like 
Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch Prime Minister or Giulio Andreotti, the Italian leader.  To 
make matters worse, furthermore, Kohl received no assistance whatsoever from 
Mitterrand who was presiding, seeing only Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Prime 
Minister and Charles Haughey, the Irish Taoiseach, rallying to his cause.42  Kohl 
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would retrospectively describe the meeting as the most unpleasant multilateral 
encounter that he had ever been involved in.43 
 Uncomfortable though it may have been for the German leader, however, the 
pattern of behaviour at Strasbourg was in no sense incompatible with an integration 
process that had been proceeding, and would continue to advance, at a highly rapid 
pace. The history of European integration is littered with bruising summits and 
fraught multilateral exchanges.44  Strasbourg in that respect was no major departure 
from the norm, although it is true that the Federal Republic was much less used to 
finding itself in a position of relative isolation than countries like France or Britain – 
the traditional bad boys of the integration process45 - might have been.  Nor have 
multiple decades of close cooperation put an end to anxious calculations about power 
balances and status within a European context.  Quite the reverse, indeed, with 
assessments about the relative power, influence and standing of each European nation 
having become more important than ever within a multilateral framework where quite 
so much was jointly at stake.  As a result, there was nothing remotely shocking about 
a situation in which the leader of a country that was already the most powerful 
member of the European Community but which appeared to be in the process of 
rapidly becoming much more powerful found himself facing anxious and periodically 
hostile questioning from his European counterparts.  That everyone in the room, 
Felipe Gonzalez apart, was also old enough to have some personal recollection of the 
Second World War naturally added a further edge to the encounter.  (And it may also 
be of some relevance that Gonzalez and Haughey both came from countries that had 
not participated in World War II.) Even without the historical overtones, however, it 
would have been surprising had a development like German reunification with all that 
it might mean for the internal balance of power of the EC, not been greeted with a 
degree of anxiety, apprehension and disquiet when the Community first met in full 
multilateral session only days after Kohl’s Ten Point Plan.  The fact that the 
Chancellor had chosen not to inform any of his European partners in advance about 
his Ten Point Plan (nor the US for that matter) only made the situation worse. 
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Nor should a dispassionate observer find the position of the French President 
particularly surprising. Leaving to one side the ongoing historiographical dispute 
about Mitterrand’s real feelings about German reunification, it made perfect tactical 
sense for the chair of the session to allow the German Chancellor to be put under 
extreme pressure over the issue of unification, given that the French wanted and 
needed German concessions on the other main point of business at the summit, 
namely the timetable of monetary union.46 A few days prior to the European Council 
meeting, Kohl had talked confidently to Bush about the prospects for advance on the 
question of EMU, but the gap between the timetable he envisaged and the much faster 
progress hoped for by the French remained significant.47  For Kohl to be ‘softened up’ 
over reunification, would facilitate the French position in the arm-wrestling ahead 
over the starting date of the intergovernmental conference on EMU.  No politician 
with Mitterrand’s tactical acumen would have let such an opportunity slip.  There is 
thus a strong element of naïveté (faux or otherwise) about some of the German 
recollections of and recriminations about the European Council meeting. 
 Where the integration process really made a difference though was in what 
happened next.   First of all, the Strasbourg meeting, while clearly unpleasant for 
Kohl personally, did not place any obstacles in Germany’s path to unification.  On the 
contrary, the Twelve not only publicly acknowledged Germany’s right to unify, 
provided it happened in a democratic fashion, but also charged the European 
Commission with the task of beginning to investigate the practical implications of 
what would amount to a de facto enlargement of the Community.48  Even at the height 
of their collective anxieties about German unity, in other words, the Twelve were 
realistic enough to know that they could not prevent one of their number from moving 
ahead towards reunification and that they should instead begin to prepare for the 
consequences. Second, within weeks rather than months the general thrust of the 
debate amongst the Twelve shifted from alarm and apprehension about the 
consequences of greater German power, to a much more forward-looking discussion 
about how best to adapt the European Community structures to cope with a reunified 
Germany at its heart.  This shift was eminently logical.  Kohl’s tormentors at 
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Strasbourg were, Thatcher apart, politicians like Lubbers or Andreotti whose 
international careers had been built on a platform of solid pro-European sentiment.49 
It was therefore entirely natural, even predictable, that once through the initial phase 
of shock and anxious foreboding, they should instead redirect their attentions to the 
question of how to respond constructively to the challenge posed by Germany’s 
altered position.  Apart from anything else, if they were to safeguard the integration 
process from which they already gained much, it made no sense to allow a long-
standing rift to develop with the Community’s most important member state and with 
the strongest figure in the European Council.  And it was equally natural and 
predictable that their collective answer to the question of how to respond should be to 
push ahead further and faster with integration.  If one of the aims of European unity 
had always been to establish a framework within which Germany could rebuild its 
strength without directly threatening its neighbours, the best response to a significant 
increase of German power, was a corresponding strengthening of the European 
framework.50  Nor was this an unrealistic aspiration, given that much of the 
groundwork had already been laid both for a significant increase in monetary 
integration – a crucial driver behind which had always been that of coping with the 
dominance of the German economy – and a more generalised push for stronger 
European structures.51  It should hence come as no real surprise, that less that two 
months after the painful Strasbourg encounter, Kohl and Mitterrand met again at 
Latché, Mitterrand’s private country residence, and reaffirmed their unity of views 
about the importance of Franco-German relations, further European unity, and 
German unification.52  A bilateral love-in rapidly followed the multilateral spat. 
 The European factor also helps make sense of Thatcher’s unfortunate 
trajectory on the issue of German reunification.53  The British leader’s initial reactions 
after all were not particularly out of line with those of many of her European 
counterparts.  She was certainly tactless, almost to the point of being offensive at 
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Strasbourg, but then so were others at the same meeting.54  But where she and her 
temporary allies parted company was once Andreotti, Lubbers and the rest turned 
towards a European solution to the German problem, since for Thatcher ‘more 
Europe’ was even less palatable than ‘more Germany’.  Within a space of months, 
therefore, Thatcher slid from being an outspoken member of a strong majority within 
the European Council, to a forceful and defiant but almost entirely isolated minority 
of one.  Intriguingly, however, many of her diplomats and ministers executed the 
same manoeuvre as Thatcher’s European counterparts and convinced themselves that 
‘more Europe’ was indeed the solution to a larger Germany, thereby turning their 
Prime Minister’s position on German unification from an external liability into one 
additional factor in the increasingly stormy relationship between the Iron Lady and 
her party and government.55  Much of the British elite were thus in step with the rest 
of Europe, even as their embattled Prime Minister diverged from the norm. 
 Finally, in terms of internal European dynamics, the integration context 
mattered because of the role in Europe’s collective response that it afforded to 
Jacques Delors.  The European Commission would inevitably have had a part to play 
in the process of German reunification, because of the need, in effect, to bring what 
would soon become the neue Bundesländer into the EC – a step which would have 
multiple legal implications, both within Germany and internationally.56  In different 
circumstances and at a different time, however, such a role might have been purely 
technical, a low-key sorting out of fiddly legal and commercial issues well outside of 
the media spotlight.  Such was the Commission President’s personal status and stature 
by 1989, however, that a purely behind the scenes contribution was never likely.  
Instead, Delors quickly gained attention by becoming one of the first prominent 
European politicians to speak enthusiastically about unification.57  He also wrote 
personally to the Federal Chancellery making clear his support for Kohl’s approach.58  
More significant still was his role within the European Council.  Within Europe’s 
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most senior decision-making body, Delors had become a key figure, lacking the 
legitimacy and political clout of the key national leaders, but making up for this 
disadvantage with an extraordinary mastery of the subject matter of each Council 
discussion.59 To the extent, therefore, that the European Council became the 
environment where Western Europe’s leaders developed that collective response to 
German reunification described above – i.e. to contain the new Germany by building 
a new, more integrated Europe – and convinced themselves that such a solution could 
actually be carried out fast enough to be effective, Delors played a central role in this 
process.  In its final shape and form, the Maastricht Treaty is often regarded as 
constituting something of a defeat for the Commission President, who had hoped to 
go rather further and faster in both policy and institutional terms.60  But in trying to 
explain the dynamics of how the European Community exploited the shock of 1989 to 
add a further major burst of acceleration to a process of integration that had already 
been advancing with some speed, the contribution of Delors to the collective 
determination, confidence and even hubris of Europe’s leaders is impossible to 
overlook.  
  
The external dimension 
The strength and vitality of the integration process also affected the calculations of 
countries outside of the EC.  The US approach for example was undoubtedly coloured 
both by a longstanding American belief that integration would make Europe a more 
stable place in general, and would help address the revival of German power in 
particular, and by the hope that were the European Community institutions 
encouraged to play a role in the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, they 
and not the US would likely end up covering most of the costs.  As Hutchings puts it 
in his explanation of why it had been Bush who first suggested that the responsibility 
of chairing the newly created G-24 committee designed to coordinate Western aid 
towards Central and Eastern Europe be handed over to the European Commission: 
‘Our view from the beginning was that the West Europeans should assume the 
principal financial assistance burden; it seemed right that the recipients of Marshall 
Plan aid should take the lead in extending its benefits eastwards, fulfilling the 
Marshall Plan’s original pan-European-vision.  Beyond these lofty considerations was 
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the more prosaic fact that we were unwilling to come up with a significant U.S. 
financial commitment.’61 
 As far as European integration was concerned the United States could 
certainly claim with some justification to have been ‘present at the creation’.62 
Historians still argue about the extent to which the Marshall Plan did or did not help 
encourage Western European countries to act collectively, or about the exact US role 
in and impact on the launch and implementation of the Schuman Plan.63  But what is 
beyond dispute is that the United States had been an enthusiastic backer of the 
integration process from the outset, for a cocktail of economic, political and Cold War 
related reasons, and that a strong residue of this early backing remained within US 
foreign-policy thinking up until the end of the Cold War.64  True, some of the first 
flush of American enthusiasm had faded over time. And it was true also, that there 
had been a few unseemly disputes over the years. Some of these had been economic 
such as the periodic squabbles between the US government and the Community 
institutions over tariff levels and agricultural protection.65  Others had been political 
and diplomatic, such as Henry Kissinger’s irritation and anger with the early 
European attempts at foreign policy coordination in the early 1970s.66  But the basic 
belief in Washington that integration was good for Europe, but good also for the 
United States, irrespective of problems that it might pose to some American exporters, 
remained in place for all of the Cold War.  Hutching’s account confirms this, while 
acknowledging the presence of some US misgivings about certain aspects of 
integration.67 The US President furthermore used many of his encounters with 
European leaders throughout 1989 and 1990 to reaffirm American backing for 
European unity.  He told the NATO summit of December 1989, for instance, that the 
US supported ‘intensified’ integration of the EC and wanted to seek closer ties with 
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the Community.68 In the planning of the new Europe, it mattered immensely that the 
most powerful external actor, the US, was rhetorically and practically committed to 
the maintenance – and expansion – of the European Community system. 
 The new post-socialist governments of Central and Eastern Europe were even 
more directly affected by the success of Western European integration.  Had the Iron 
Curtain come down six or seven years earlier than it did, there might perhaps have 
been room for doubt on the part of the fledgling democratic regimes as to whether 
they really wanted to get involved: the European Community of the early 1980s had 
been a rather lacklustre affair, riven by internal disputes, frustrated by the 
malfunctioning of its own institutional system, and seemingly incapable of addressing 
the serious economic malaise that afflicted Western Europe.  Delors’ predecessor, 
Gaston Thorn, had made no attempt to hide his disillusionment with Europe’s 
malaise, telling the European Parliament in early 1981: ‘Today Europe… is a rather 
ramshackle house.  Its roof has been blown away by disunity.  There is no heating, 
since energy is in short supply.  There is no architect, since the generation of founding 
fathers who supervised the building has passed away.  The builder is on the verge of 
bankruptcy, his resources virtually exhausted… The tenants are at their wits’ end.’69   
The inordinate amount of time that the EC was taking to honour its pledges to expand 
to include Spain and Portugal would also have been a disincentive.70 Having applied 
to join in the mid-1970s, with strong expectations of becoming member states by 
1981 or 1982, the two Iberian countries had instead been kept cooling their heels on 
the threshold of the EC until January 1986.71 In 1989-90, by contrast, there was much 
less scope for uncertainty.  The Community was booming, the objective of creating a 
fully barrier free internal market by the end of 1992 having unleashed all of its pent 
up potential, and the Spanish and Portuguese had not merely belatedly taken their 
place within it, but were also enjoying an extraordinary surge in prosperity as a result.  
For both economic and political reasons, a ‘return to Europe’ as the slogan put it, 
could only mean one thing to the emerging governments of Central and Eastern 
Europe: the earliest possible membership of the European Community.  Only this 
would begin, quickly, to undo the huge gap of living standards that existed between 
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the two halves of Europe.  And only this would undo the enforced separation from the 
European mainstream that countries such as Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia felt 
that they had unjustly endured.  
 This entirely comprehensible determination to join had a number of crucial 
international implications.  For a start it made it very difficult for the existing member 
states of the European Communities to reject such Central and Eastern European 
demands.  There were many in Western Europe who were filled with apprehension 
about what a vast expansion of the EC system to encompass much of the former 
Communist bloc might entail, anxious about the costs, concerned that the institutional 
system would not be able to cope, and worried that widening might get in the way of 
the hoped for deepening of the integration process.  At the January 1990 Latché 
meeting between Kohl and Mitterrand referred to above, there was a yawning gap 
between the German leader’s confidence that the newly liberated countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe would take their place within an expanding European 
Community, and the French president’s equally obvious scepticism about whether this 
could or should ever happen.72  The increased urgency with which the Commission 
threw itself into the negotiation of what would become the European Economic Area 
(EEA), a wider zone of liberalisation, in which participating countries would be part 
of the European internal market without being full Community members, was 
similarly indicative of a desire to stave off, or at very least postpone, a vast expansion 
in membership.73  And similar thought processes were undoubtedly occurring in 
multiple member state capitals also.  But the prospects of success of such schemes 
were always very poor.  What incentive was there for the newly liberated states of 
Central and Eastern Europe to settle for half involvement, when the whole point of 
‘returning to Europe’ was precisely to rejoin fully, not to linger in some ante-
chamber? Furthermore there were already many in the West also who recognised that 
an entity such as the European Community that had long considered itself and 
described itself as ‘uniting Europe’ could not turn down requests to join from such 
manifestly European countries as Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia.74  The 
successful precedent of the Community’s Southern European enlargement was also 
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being cited as a reason for hastening forward rather than holding back. The road to 
full membership for the states of Central and Eastern Europe would be a slow and 
hard one, and as had earlier been the case with Spain and Portugal, the EC (soon EU) 
would reflect the ongoing hesitations that many still felt about enlargement by moving 
rather more slowly than many would have liked.  That the eventual end point of the 
process, though, was Community or EU membership was not really in doubt from 
1990 onwards. 
 This in turn had important implications for the various pan-European visions, 
outlined by Mikhail Gorbachev, but also Mitterrand, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and 
many others.75  If the EC itself was going to expand – and an EC that was in the 
process of equipping itself with a wide array of new policy instruments and priorities -  
what room would be left for other, wider European structures?  As noted above, the 
European Community had long developed something of a reputation as an 
institutional sponge, an entity liable to suck up or absorb policy areas and tasks 
previously carried out by other institutions.  The only consistent exception to this rule 
has been NATO, where the centrality of the US as the main provider of security had 
always made any purely European arrangement seem less attractive.  Outside of the 
security field, however, the Community/Union has not been an easy body to co-exist 
with.  This being so, there was a real question mark over whether there would be 
space for a significant new overarching pan-European entity.  Furthermore, the 
leaders of Central and Eastern Europe had every reason to look at such pan-European 
schemes with a slightly jaundiced eye.  They were well aware that not everybody in 
Western Europe was overjoyed at the prospect of 25+ member EC/EU.  Was there not 
a danger, therefore, that any pan-European structure suggested was nothing more than 
a device to render less urgent, if not remove altogether, the need to expand the core 
European structures?  The serious suspicions that would gradually accumulate about 
Mitterrand’s Confederation plan illustrate these fears quite clearly.76  Membership in 
something like the Council of Europe or the newly created Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was all very well if it was clear that it was a 
staging post on the way to the alignment that really mattered, rather than an 
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alternative.  But constructing anything more powerful than either of these two bodies 
became next to impossible, as soon as the successor states decided that their future lay 
within the EC/EU and NATO. 
 All of this was of course very bad news for the Soviet Union or Russia, as it 
would soon become.  As Mary Sarotte and many others have argued, the failure to 
establish any strong over-arching Pan-European body was a body blow to those who 
had hoped to involve Russia more centrally in Europe’s future – and a failure that has 
had unfortunate effects on Russian attitudes and policies towards the West that are 
still very much with us today.77  The implication of this essay, though, is that this 
failure was an almost inevitable consequence once it became clear that it was to the 
EC/EU that the states of Central and Eastern Europe had turned as soon as they threw 
off communist rule.  At no stage has anyone, in the West or in Moscow, seriously 
suggested that Russia itself could join the EC/EU.  In the confused and often 
infuriatingly vague discussions that became very à la mode in early 1990s Western 
Europe about where Europe ended and how large the EC/EU might become, virtually 
the only point of consensus was that Russia itself lay beyond the realm of possibility.  
Nor was there any appetite within a former superpower for involvement in an 
institutional system based upon the partial transfer of sovereignty.  And yet if Russia 
could not be involved, and the EC/EU was to become the key feature of the European 
architecture leaving scant space for any other, it followed ineluctably that Russia was 
going to be excluded from the central debate about Europe’s future.  The dynamism 
and magnetic attraction of the integration process in the 1989-90 thus played a central 
role also in the distancing of Russia from a post-communist Europe. 
 
Conclusions 
The core argument of this chapter is thus that fewer options were really open in 1989-
1990 than appeared to be the case.  When the Berlin Wall came down there was 
undeniably a brief heady moment when all sorts of possibilities suddenly seemed to 
open up, both exhilarating and frightening.  This sense of flux manifested itself in the 
rhetoric of a new Europe and in the debate about how such a Europe should be 
organised.  But what both that debate, and perhaps still more the historiography about 
that debate, has tended to underplay is the extent to which the continent’s course had 
                                                 
77 Sarotte, 1989, 212–214. 
 24 
already been set before the Wall came down.  By 1989 Western Europe was moving 
quickly along a path that led to much closer European integration, encompassing 
monetary integration, closer foreign policy cooperation and greater levels of 
cooperation over issues such as border controls, police cooperation etc.  In deciding to 
address the fears awakened by the prospect of greater German power, by constructing 
a stronger Europe, the Twelve were thus simply redoubling an effort already 
underway – indeed their very ability to concoct so quickly a recipe for dealing with a 
strengthened Germany, reflected the fact that the ingredients had already been 
assembled and the cooking process had long since begun. The shape of the Western 
European response to the prospect of German unification, including the Federal 
Republic’s own response, was thus deeply path dependent on the pre-existing 
integration process.  Only Thatcher amongst Western Europe’s leaders of the time 
dissented, and the inefficacy of her attempt to oppose both German unification and 
further European integration underlines the potency – and interlinked nature – of both 
processes. 
 The dynamic state of the integration process also did much to predetermine the 
trajectory of countries outside of the EC.  So strong was the magnetic pull of the 
booming Community of the late 1980s, that the post-communist regimes of Central 
and Eastern Europe had few hesitations about making the attainment of EC/EU 
membership the centre-piece of their international aspirations.  Over the years that 
followed this decision would have a huge impact on the nature of their transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy and from command economies to capitalism.  But it 
also had less positive consequences for the fleeting hopes of building a pan-European 
structure with meaningful powers, able, amongst other things, to keep Russia fully 
involved in the European game.  For the determination of the Central and Eastern 
Europeans to allow nothing to distract or impede them in their march towards EC/EU 
membership and the expansionist institutional characteristics of the EC/EU itself 
combined to make all but impossible the establishment of a viable wider-European 
structure large enough to incorporate the Russians also. 
 What Sarotte has called the ‘pre-fab’ solution was therefore always likely, 
however beguiling the other options might have been.78 What made an EC/EU centred 
solution to Europe’s institutional architecture attractive, but also what made it so 
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eminently suitable from the point of view of political leaderships in both halves of the 
formerly divided Europe, was precisely that European integration was a dynamic and 
fast moving process, with a track record of success but also able to be expanded and 
adapted to cope with the new situation that the end of the Cold War brought into 
being.  A new Europe was indeed constructed over the 1989-2004 period, but it was a 
Europe shaped deeply by a process the essential characteristics and basic trajectory of 
which, had been set long before the Iron Curtain fell. Within the new, a great deal of 
the old persisted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
